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Despite my many trips to Ireland, I have never yet been to Cork. Therefore, I have never 
visited its university, formerly called Queen’s College. But surfing the web I came across 
a description of the Aula Maxima of Queen’s College. On the east-facing window of this 
hall there is the Boole Memorial Window, made up of ten glass panels in two rows of five 
panels each. Each panel represents a branch of knowledge. For instance, the second 
panel in the bottom row represents Mathematics, depicting Bacon, Napier and Newton, 
and the last panel in the top row represents Engineering and Architecture, in the figures 
of Archimedes and Phidias. The central panel in the bottom row represents Logic, and 
there are three figures: Aristotle and Euclid standing behind George Boole (1815-1864), 
seated at a desk, writing (Fig. 1). Born in Lincoln (Lincolnshire) in 1815, Boole was 
appointed professor of mathematics at Queen’s College Cork in 1849, thanks to his 
papers and his reputation. Being a self-educated man, with no university training, this 
was a huge achievement, to say the least.1 The Boole Memorial Window was built in 
1866 in memory of Boole, the first professor of mathematics at Queen’s College Cork. 
Boole is chiefly remembered for his work on mathematical logic, especially his An 
Investigation of the Laws of Thought on which are Founded the Mathematical Theories 
of Logic and Probabilities (1854) [henceforth, Laws of Thought], a milestone in the 
historical development of mathematical logic. In the introduction, Boole explained that 
the design of his work was: 
...to investigate the fundamental laws of those operations of the mind by which reasoning 
is performed; to give expression to them in the symbolical language of Calculus, and upon 
this foundation to establish the science of Logic and construct its method; to make that 
method itself the basis of a general method for the application of the mathematical doctrine 
of Probabilities, and, finally, to collect from the various elements of truth brought to view in 
the course of these inquiries some probable intimations concerning the nature and 
constitution of the human mind (Boole, 1854, I, §1). 
From the very first lines, Boole stressed the novelty of the conception, method and 
results shown in his book, the more so since ‘in its ancient and scholastic form, indeed, 
the subject of Logic stands almost exclusively associated with the great name of Aristotle’ 
(Boole, 1854, I, §2).   
Much has been written about Boole and his logic, Boolean algebra, or Boole’s influence 
on circuit theory and computer programming.2 This is clearly the reason why he appears 
in the panel of Logic in the Memorial Window in Queen’s College Cork. However, 
although his most outstanding contribution is the application of mathematics to the 
domain of pure thought, that is to say, mathematical or formal logic, Boole did research 
into other branches of mathematics as well. Hence, his papers on analytical 
transformations and the theory of linear transformations seem to have been the seeds 
of the theory of invariants, later developed by Cayley and Sylvester. When it comes to 
differential equations, his research focused on criteria for distinguishing between singular 
solutions and particular solutions, integrating factors, symbolical methods and also 
partial differential equations. His textbooks on differential equations and on finite 
differences showed his teaching methods. As can be inferred from the complete title of 
the Laws of Thought, Boole was also interested in the theory of probability and, in 
                                                            
1 For a thorough account of Boole’s life and works, see MacHale (1985, reprinted in 2014). 
2 Boole’s work on logic and its subsequent influence on the development of this subject are 
discussed in Kneale and Kneale (1962, chapter VI). See also the first part of Hailperin (1986). 
particular, the application of his logical system to the calculus of events.3 The Laws of 
Thought was not exactly a republication of Boole’s former work on logic, The 
Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847). Although the first part of the former was mainly 
devoted to the same subject as in the latter, the same system of fundamental laws being 
established in both, the methods shown in the Laws of Thought were more general and 
the range of applications wider (Boole, 1854, Preface). In particular, the second part 
(chapters XVI-XXI) focused on the theory of probability, in an attempt to construct an 
elaborate mathematical system regarding this subject. 
From my experience in teaching statistics at various engineering schools, I am well 
aware that probability represents a rather overwhelming obstacle for students, due to the 
conceptual difficulties inherent in the topic. And, more often than not, students complain 
about the subjectiveness of probability.  
What were Boole’s views on the nature of the theory of probabilities? On the one hand, 
Boole considered the theory and method of probabilities to be based upon the general 
doctrine and method of logic because: 
Before we can determine the mode in which the expected frequency of occurrence of a 
particular event is dependent upon the known frequency of occurrence of any other events, 
we must be acquainted with the mutual dependence of the events themselves. Speaking 
technically, we must be able to express the event whose probability is sought, as a function 
of the events whose probabilities are given (Boole, 1854, I, §12). 
This is why logic has to be studied prior to the theory of probabilities.  
On the other hand, probability admits of numerical measurement. Therefore, it belongs 
both to arithmetic (the science of number) and to logic: 
… there exists a definite relation between the laws by which the probabilities of events are 
expressed as algebraic functions of the probabilities of other events upon which they 
depend, and the laws by which the logical connexion of the events is itself expressed 
(Boole, 1854, I, §15) 
It was the acknowledgement of the dual nature of the theory of probability, numerical and 
logical, that made the Laws of Thought different from all previous treatises. Accordingly, 
once Boole had established the object of the theory of probabilities:  
Given the probabilities of any events, of whatever kind [simple or compound], to find the 
probability of some other event connected with them [simple or compound] (Boole, 1854, 
XVI, §§4-5). 
the solution to which had not been successfully investigated yet, he then introduced a 
new way of tackling it, which consists in: 
… substituting for events the propositions which assert that those events have occurred, 
or will occur; and viewing the element of numerical probability as having reference to the 
truth of those propositions, not to the occurrence of the events concerning which they make 
assertion (Boole, 1854, XVI, §6). 
Hence, for instance, the numerical fraction p would no longer be the expression of the 
probability of the occurrence of an event E, but rather it would represent the probability 
of the truth of the proposition X, ‘that the event E will occur’. Like this, the theory of 
probability could be studied as an application of the theory of propositions discussed in 
the first part of the Laws of Thought. By means of the method of the calculus of logic, it 
was possible to express the event whose probability was sought as a logical function of 
the events whose probabilities were given. This would result in a logical equation, which 
in turn would lead to a series of algebraic equations, implicitly involving the solution of 
the problem proposed (Boole, 1854, I, §15). 
                                                            
3 There is a thorough study about Boole’s work on probability in the second part of Hailperin 
(1986).  
In Chapter XVI Boole defined probability as follows: 
The probability of an event is the reason we have to believe that it has taken place, or that 
it will take place. 
The measure of the probability of an event is the ratio of the number of cases favourable 
to that event, to the total number of cases favourable or contrary, and all equally possible 
(equally likely to happen) (Boole, 1854, XVI, §2). 
As he pointed out in a footnote, he had adopted Poisson’s definition of probability 
(Poisson, 1837, I, art. 1 and 2). However, while Boole wrote ‘equally likely to happen’, in 
the original text Poisson referred to ‘tous également possibles, ou qui ont tous une même 
chance’ (Poisson, 1837, I, art. 2). According to Poisson (1837, I, art. 1), ‘chance’ and 
‘probability’ were nearly synonyms in everyday life. Yet, in a work on probabilities, there 
was a difference in meaning between them: the word ‘chance’ was connected with the 
events themselves, regardless of the knowledge we have about them, whereas the word 
‘probability’ referred to the above definition. 
For the study of the chapters related to the theory of probabilities, in the preface of the 
Laws of Thought Boole recommended the reading of a treatise on probability written by 
Sir John Lubbock. Boole was here clearly alluding to On Probability, an undated and 
anonymous tract, no doubt written by John W. Lubbock (1803-1865) and John E. 
Drinkwater Bethune (1801-1851) and published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful 
Knowledge around 1830. Lubbock and Drinkwater Bethune reflected on the use of the 
word ‘chance’: 
1. In considering any future event, we are generally unable to determine whether or not it 
will happen; yet, we can often conjecture the number of cases which are possible, and of 
these how many favour the production of the event in question. In our uncertainty, we say 
that there is a chance it will happen; and thus our idea of chance arises from our wanting 
data which might enable us to decide whether or not the event will take place. 
5. Simpson has defined the probability of an event to be the ratio of the chances by which 
the event in question may happen to all the chances by which it may happen or fail. In this 
definition the word chance must be understood a way of happening; we, however, 
frequently say, “I left such a thing to chance”, or, “such a thing is entirely chance”; these 
expressions, which are in some measure sanctioned by common use, are intended to 
signify that we are ignorant of the causes which produce the event in question, or that we 
do not influence its occurrence (Lubbock and Drinkwater Bethune, 1830, §§1 and 5, my 
emphasis). 
From the above reflections, it is clear that there were two distinct uses of the word 
‘chance’: one concerned with the happening of an event (that is, probability, in its 
mathematical acceptation), and another one connected, in ordinary language, with our 
ignorance of the causes that produce an event. Despite referring to the works of Poisson 
and Lubbock and Drinkwater Bethune, Boole seemed to avoid the word ‘chance’. Did he 
do this on purpose, to stress the algebraic-logical nature of probability, and its 
independence from one’s own mind?  
The concept of probability depended, nevertheless, on partial knowledge (Boole, 1854, 
XVI, §2). Consequently, the probability of an event may change, depending on our 
knowledge about the circumstances under which the event occurs. In general, this 
knowledge could be obtained from the particular constitution of the piece involved in the 
occurrence of the event (e.g. the constitution of a die) or from the long-continued 
observation of the success and failure of events. Likewise, Lubbock and Drinkwater 
Bethune (1830, §9) asserted: ‘Probability does not exist in the abstract, but always refers 
to the knowledge possessed by some particular individual’. An assertion that, in a way, 
is in keeping with one of the meanings of the word ‘subjective’: dependent on an 
individual’s perception for its existence. If we adopt this sense of the word, after all, we 
could agree with our students that the concept of probability is a rather subjective topic!  
The information we possess about the occurrence of a certain event turns out to be 
fundamental when computing probabilities. We all know that the probability of rolling a 
‘6’ with a fair die is 1/6. But what if we learn beforehand that an even number or a multiple 
of ‘3’ came up? What is then the probability of rolling a ‘6’? However simple, this example 
illustrates the main idea of conditional probability, that is, the probability of an event A, 
given another event B, ܲሺA|Bሻ. Boole wrote a good deal on conditional probability, or, as 
he called it, ‘the connexion of causes and effects’: 
From the probabilities of causes assigned à priori [sic], or given by experience, and their 
respective probabilities of association with an effect contemplated, it may be required to 
determine the probability of that effect (…). On the other hand, it may be required to 
determine the probability of a particular cause, or of some particular connexion among 
a system of causes, from observed effects, and the known tendencies of the said causes, 
singly or in connexion, to the production of such effects (Boole, 1854, XX, §1, my 
emphasis). 
This kind of question was also known as ‘inverse probability’ at the time.4 One of the first 
to use such an expression was Augustus De Morgan (1806-1871) in his An Essay on 
Probabilities (1838), a work recommended by Boole in his preface, as preliminary 
reading for the study of the chapters related to the theory of probabilities. De Morgan 
referred to ‘inverse questions’: ‘Where we know the event which has happened, and 
require the probability which results therefrom to any particular set of circumstances 
under which it might have happened’ (De Morgan, 1838, II, 31-32), as opposed to ‘direct 
questions’: ‘Where we know the previous circumstances and require the probability of an 
event’ (De Morgan, 1838, II, 31). According to De Morgan, inverse questions originated 
with Thomas Bayes (1702-1761) and his An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the 
Doctrine of Chances (published posthumously in the Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society in 1763), a rather forgotten fact at the time (De Morgan, 1838, preface, 
vii).  
Boole believed that social problems could be studied by means of the theory of 
probability, since ‘phaenomena, in the production of which large masses of men are 
concerned, do actually exhibit a very remarkable degree of regularity’ (Boole, 1854, I, 
§15). In this context, probabilities could be regarded as founded upon continued 
observation. Thus, for instance, chapter XXI of the Laws of Thought dealt with a practical 
application in the social field, namely, the question of the probability of judgments 
(connected with decisions of judges, juries and so on), a very popular question in the 
nineteenth century. Here again, Boole distinguished between direct and inverse 
questions: 
The direct questions of probability are those in which the probability of correct decision 
for each member of the tribunal, or of guilt for the accused party, are supposed to be known 
à priori [sic], and in which the probability of a decision of a particular kind, or with a definite 
majority, is sought. Inverse problems are those in which, from the data furnished by 
experience, it is required to determine some element which, though it stand to those data 
in the relation of causes to effect, cannot directly be made the subject of observation; as 
when from the records of the decisions of courts it is required to determine the probability 
that a member of a court will judge correctly. To this species of problems, the most difficult 
and the most important of the whole series, attention will chiefly be directed here (Boole, 
1854, XXI, §2, my emphasis). 
A detailed discussion of the question of the probability of judgments is beyond the scope 
of this paper.5 But seeing as Boole was so interested in it, it is nevertheless worth 
providing a simple example, concerning unanimous decisions from witnesses and 
inverse probability: 
                                                            
4 For a full history of the inverse probability, see Dale (1999). 
5 See, for instance, Hailperin (1986, 376-389). 
Example 3. The probability that a witness A speaks the truth is p, the probability that 
another witness B speaks the truth is q, and the probability that they disagree in a statement 
is r. What is the probability that if they agree, their statement is true? (Boole 1854, XVIII, 
§4). 
In De Morgan (1838) I found a much simpler version of this example, rather rhetoric, 
considering ݌ ൌ ݍ ൌ 3/4 in Boole’s example: 
EXAMPLE II: Two witnesses, on each of whom it is 3 to 1 that he speaks the truth, unite in 
affirming that an event did happen, which of itself is equally likely to have happened or not 
to have happened. What is the probability that the event did happen? 
The fact observed is the agreement of the two witnesses in asserting the event: the two 
possible antecedents (equally likely) are: 1. The event did happen. 2. The event did not 
happen. If it did happen, the probability that both witnesses should state its happening is 
that of their both telling the truth, which is ¾ x ¾, or 9/16. If it did not happen, then the 
probability that both witnesses should assert its happening is that of their both speaking 
falsely, which is ¼ x ¼, or 1/16. Consequently, the probability that the event did happen is 
the (9 +1)th part of 9, or 9/10; that is, it is 9 to 1 in favour of the event having happened (De 
Morgan, 1838, III, 56). 
In Lubbock and Drinkwater Bethune (1830) there is a more general account of this 
problem, with n witnesses, but again with the same probability of giving the right decision: 
Ex. 24. A jury consists of n individuals; let the probability of each separately giving a right 
decision be p, what is the probability that a unanimous decision is a correct one? Two 
hypotheses can be formed, namely, that the decision is a correct one, or the contrary; the 
event observed is a unanimous decision, and the à priori [sic] probability of this event on 
the first hypothesis is ݌௡, the à priori [sic] probability of the event on the second hypothesis 
is ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡, therefore the probability of the first hypothesis is ௣೙௣೙ାሺଵି௣ሻ೙ , which is greater 
than 1/2, only when ݌ ൐ 1/2. Therefore it is probable that a unanimous verdict is a correct 
one, only when it is probable that each juryman considered separately will give a correct 
decision (Lubbock and Drinkwater Bethune, 1830, §50). 
Now, let us outline how Boole solved the problem by applying the doctrine and method 
of logic, explained in the first part of the Laws of Thought. If ݔ represents the hypothesis 
that A speaks truth, and ݕ represents the hypothesis that B speaks truth, then the 
hypothesis that A and B disagree in their statement can be represented by: 
ݔሺ1 െ ݕሻ ൅ ݕሺ1 െ ݔሻ 
Consequently, the hypothesis that A and B agree can be represented by: 
ݔݕ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݔሻሺ1 െ ݕሻ 
where xy symbolises the hypothesis that they agree in the truth. The data given in the 
example can be expressed as follows: 
Prob.		ݔ ൌ ݌,	Prob.		ݕ ൌ ݍ,	Prob.		ݔሺ1 െ ݕሻ ൅ ݕሺ1 െ ݔሻ ൌ ݎ 
To determine the probability that if both witnesses agree, their statement is true, we have 
to compute the conditional probability: 
Prob.		ݔݕ
Prob.		ݔݕ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݔሻሺ1 െ ݕሻ	 
which is evidently the same as:  
Prob.		ݔݕ
	1 െ 	ݎ	  
Let consider the following system: 
൜ݔሺ1 െ ݕሻ ൅ ݕሺ1 െ ݔሻ ൌ ݏݔݕ ൌ ݓ  
Using the reduction of systems of propositions, studied in chapter VIII of the Laws of 
Thought, this system gives: 
ሼݔሺ1 െ ݕሻ ൅ ݕሺ1 െ ݔሻሽሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ݏሼݔݕ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݔሻሺ1 െ ݕሻሽ ൅ ݔݕሺ1 െ ݓሻ ൅ ݓሺ1 െ ݔݕሻ ൌ 0 
From this we can infer that: 
ݓ ൌ ݔሺ1 െ ݕሻሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ݕሺ1 െ ݔሻሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ݏݔݕ ൅ ݏሺ1 െ ݔሻሺ1 െ ݕሻ ൅ ݔݕ2ݔݕ െ 1  
After developing this equation and applying Proposition IV (Boole, 1854, XVII, §14), 
Boole arrived at the following expression: 
Prob.		ݓ ൌ ݔݕሺ1 െ ݏሻݔݕሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ݔሺ1 െ ݕሻݏ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݔሻݕݏ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݔሻሺ1 െ ݕሻሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൌ 
ൌ ݌ ൅ ݍ െ ݎ2  
Finally, the probability sought is: 
Prob.		ݔݕ
	1 െ 	ݎ	 ൌ
݌ ൅ ݍ െ ݎ
2ሺ1 െ ݎሻ  
I chose this example because it reminded me of some of the exercises we do in class to 
illustrate the application of conditional probability and Bayes’ theorem. We would say 
that the events ‘the statement is true’ and ‘the statement is false’ together form the 
sample space. Let ‘unanimous yes’ be an event from the same sample space, of which 
we know the joint probabilities with ‘the statement is true’ and with ‘the statement is false’, 
respectively. The goal is to compute the probability of the event ‘the statement is true’, 
given the event ‘unanimous yes’, that is, ܲሺthe statement is true|unanimous yesሻ. 
Boole was certainly concerned with the question of the probability of judgments. Not only 
was chapter XXI of the Laws of Thought devoted to this question. In 1857 Boole 
published the paper ‘On the application of the theory of probabilities to the question of 
the combination of testimonies or judgments’ in the Transactions of the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh, for which he had won the Keith Medal for the period 1855-1857, the highest 
prize awarded by the Royal Society of Edinburgh. This seems to point out that Boole’s 
work on probability was highly regarded in his lifetime. Yet, as the Boole Memorial 
Window suggests, Boole is largely remembered for his work on mathematical logic. I 
have to acknowledge that that has been my vision for many years, too. It was precisely 
to make up for my unawareness that I decided to get a glimpse of Boole’s contribution 
to the development of the theory of probabilities to celebrate the bicentenary of his birth. 
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